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Abstract 
The process of liberalisation of India’s economy since 1991 has brought with it 
considerable development both of its financial markets and the legal institutions 
which support these. An influential body of recent economic work asserts that a 
country’s ‘legal origin’—as a civilian or common law jurisdiction—plays an 
important  part  in  determining  the  development  of  its  investor  protection 
regulations, and consequently its financial development. An alternative theory 
claims  that  the  determinants  of  investor  protection  are  political,  rather  than 
legal. We use the case of India to test these theories. We find little support for 
the idea that India’s legal heritage as a common law country has been influential 
in speeding the path of regulatory reforms and financial development. There is a 
complementarity between (i) India’s relative success in services and software, 
(ii) the relative strength of its financial markets for outside equity, as opposed to 
outside debt, and (iii) the relative success of stock market regulation, as opposed 
to reforms of creditor rights. We conclude that political explanations have more 
traction  in  explaining  the  case  of  India      than  do  theories  based  on  ‘legal 
origins’. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A  growing  literature  emphasises  the  importance  of  legal  institutions  for 
economic  development.  Two  significant  claims  within  this  tradition  are  as 
follows. First, that ‘law matters’ for firms’ access to finance: that is, the quality 
of a country’s legal protection of investors affects the ability of its firms to raise 
outside finance. Secondly, that a country’s ‘legal origin’ significantly affects the 
evolution of its legal rules. That is, ‘common law’ legal institutions are thought 
both to exhibit a greater degree of adaptability than ‘civil law’ systems, through 
relying more on ‘bottom up’ rule-making by the judiciary, as opposed to ‘top-
down’  codifications,  and  to  be  less  susceptible  to  corrosion  by  rent-seeking 
politicians and bureaucrats, owing to the greater constitutional independence of 
their  judiciary.  This  paper  uses  the  case  of  India,  one  of  the  world’s  most 
significant developing economies, as a case study for exploring the applicability 
of these theories.  
 
The Indian economy liberalised dramatically in 1991. Since then, there have 
been  rapid  and  far-reaching  law  reforms  intended  to  ensure  that  legal 
institutions keep pace with the needs of the growing economy. To shed light on 
the mechanisms by which these legal changes were brought about, and their 
relationship with the needs of investors, we conducted interviews with a range 
of  Indian  lawyers,  policymakers,  regulators,  judges,  businesspeople  and 
investors. We focus our enquiries on changes to the legal protection of outside 
investors: that is, shareholders and creditors. These yield interesting findings 
both  as  regards  the  modalities  of  legal  change  and  its  relationship  with 
development.  
 
As  regards  the  modalities  of  law  reform,  the  most  effective  institutions  for 
producing improved legal rules have been regulatory agencies to which rule-
making  power  for  specific  sectors  have  been  delegated:  for  example,  the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI). In contrast, statutory changes have been slower to implement: the nature 
of coalition politics in India, coupled with very activist judicial review, means 
that legislation is a slow and erratic process. Moreover, the Indian judiciary has 
not played a significant role in ‘adapting’ the substantive law to the changed 
needs of an open economy. Very long delays in Indian civil procedure mean 
that courts have simply been too slow to play a significant role in updating law. 
This strongly contradicts the ‘legal origins’ claim, at least as regards India. 
 
There appears to be a correlation between effective legal protection of investors 
in India and the development of markets for outside finance in India. Thus the   4 
laws protecting equity investors have been dramatically improved, and equity 
markets  are  flourishing;  much  less  has  been  achieved  in  the  way  of  legal 
protection  for  creditors  and  markets  for  arms-length  debt  finance—that  is, 
corporate  bonds—are  practically  non-existent.  In  turn,  this  complements 
sectoral trends in the pattern of Indian development:
 those sectors for which 
equity  finance  is  more  complementary  (e.g.  ‘new  economy’  sectors  such  as 
software,  pharmaceuticals  and  high-tech  manufacturing)  have  been  highly 
successful,  whereas  ‘old  economy’  sectors,  such  as  heavy  manufacturing, 
traditionally more reliant on debt finance, have seen rather more limited growth. 
This  implies  a  link  between  the  quality  of  legal  institutions  and  the  real 
economy. However, we find little evidence that these sectoral differences in 
economic development have been caused by differences in the quality of legal 
protection  of  investors.  Rather,  both  appear  to  have  been  influenced  by  the 
legacy of political choices taken during the era of central planning. In industries 
that  were  subject  to  planning,  the  dominant  interest  groups  lobby  for 
redistributive rules to maintain their protected status. By contrast, in sectors that 
were never subject to central planning, the dominant interest groups seek rules 
that allow markets to function more effectively. In short, the quality of investor 
protection and sectoral development have both co-evolved on paths that have 
been  to  a  large  degree  determined  by  past  political  choices.  This  in  turn 
contradicts the ‘law matters’ claim, as applied to India. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of 
the principal claims in the ‘law and finance’ literature. Section 3 is a snapshot of 
the distinctive complementarities between India’s industrial structure, financing 
patterns, and legal institutions protecting investors. In Section 4, we explore 
whether, and to what extent, this pattern is a function of India’s common law 
legal heritage, focusing in particular on the role of the judiciary and judge-made 
law. Section 5 then turns to the role of politics in India’s legal and financial 
development. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2.The role of law in financial development: a review 
 
Economists have recently become interested in the links between institutions—
that is, the formal and informal rules that effectively constrain agents’ actions—
and growth. This programme began with the pioneering work of North (1990). 
By the late 1990s, systematic comparative research into micro-level institutions, 
such as the quality of corporate and financial laws, had begun, in the pioneering 
and highly influential work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2006, 2008; Djankov et al., 2002, 2003, 2007,   5 
2008; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Botero et al., 2004).
1 The ‘law and 
finance’ analysis is based on an empirical and theoretical evaluation of different 
legal systems, and has been conducted at two discrete levels of generality. The 
first  claim,  which  may  be  termed  ‘quality  of  law’,  is  that  the  greater  the 
protection afforded to investors (that is, minority shareholders and creditors) by 
a country’s legal system, the more external financing firms in that jurisdiction 
will be able to obtain. La Porta et al (1997) constructed indices for a range of 
different aspects of the law relating to business organisation.
2 However, many 
of  the  regressions  rely  on  cross-sectional  data,  creating  difficulties  over  the 
interpretation  of  causation.  Whilst  ‘good  quality’  legal  rules  could  enhance 
investment, it is also plausible that financial structure influences the creation of 
legal norms (Cheffins, 2001; Coffee, 2001).
3  
 
A second claim, which may be referred to as ‘legal origin’, is a response to the 
causality  issue.  This  asserts  that  the  quality  of  legal  institutions  varies 
systematically with the ‘origin’ of a country’s legal system—whether it falls 
into  the  Anglo-American  ‘common  law’,  or  Napoleonic,  German  or 
Scandinavian  ‘civil  law’  systems.  This  idea  emerges  empirically  from 
significant correlations between legal origins and the quality of law scores. As 
legal  origin  is,  for  most  countries  in  the  world,  exogenous—deriving  from 
whichever  of  the  western  powers  colonized  the  country  in  question—LLSV 
argue that this supports the view that law drives financial development, rather 
than vice versa (La Porta et al, 2006).  
 
The legal origins claim has in turn been criticised on the basis that the practical 
application of the fourfold classification that forms the explanatory variable—
namely, into common law and French, German, and Nordic civil law systems—
is fraught with difficulties. Whilst one may clearly distinguish the legal systems 
of  the  ‘mother  countries’—England,  France,  and  Germany—the  appropriate 
characterisation of most of the countries included in the regression studies—that 
is,  the  legal  systems  of  countries  in  Eastern  Europe,  Asia,  Africa  and  Latin 
America—is anything but clear (Pistor et al, 2003; Dam, 2006; Siems, 2007).  
 
To be sure, the classification by legal origins is really no more than a proxy for 
underlying differences. In order to avoid problems of classification, therefore, it 
would be better to seek to code these differences directly. This, however, begs 
the  question  as  to  the  nature  of  the  particular  mechanisms  by  which  legal 
institutions are thought to influence the content of legal rules. One hypothesis 
(the ‘adaptability’ claim) concerns the way in which new rules are produced 
(Beck et al, 2003a; 2003b). Civilian systems are characterised by wide-ranging 
codification of legal rules, whereas common law systems are distinguished by   6 
their  reliance  on  incremental  change  through  the  accumulation  of  judicial 
precedent. It may be that this ability to shape the law on a case-by-case basis 
helps to render legal regulation more adaptable to changed circumstances. In 
contrast, civilian legal systems may suffer from excessive rigidity, as changes 
may only be made infrequently through legislation. Associated with this is a 
difference  in  ‘regulatory  style’  (Botero  et  al,  2004):  common  law  systems 
favour  market  solutions—contract  and  private  litigation—over  ‘top  down’ 
regulation and enforcement through government agencies in civilian systems. 
 
A second hypothesis (the ‘political’ claim) posits that judges in common law 
systems have greater power (as lawmakers) and independence from the other 
branches of government, and consequently may be expected to do a better job in 
protecting private property rights from encroachment by the state (Hayek, 1978; 
Mahoney, 2001; Dam, 2006). In contrast in civilian jurisdictions, the legislature 
has  greater  control  over  legal  institutions,  including  judicial  appointment, 
selection and tenure, which means that the judiciary are less able to protect 
individual property rights against rent-seeking by the state. This focuses on the 
protection of investors’ property rights, and the ability of a state or system to 
commit credibly to do this over time.  
 
Both  of  these  claims  have  been  criticised  as  being  based  upon  overly 
reductionist characterisations of the difference between civil and common law 
systems. On the one hand, it is clear that judges do make law in civilian systems 
(Mattei,  1997;  Pistor  and  Xu,  2003);  on  the  other  hand,  commercial  and 
corporate laws are subject to a relatively high degree of codification in common 
law systems (Funken, 2003; Armour, 2008). What is more, if the legal origins 
claim  is  accurate,  it  implies  the  existence  of  extremely  strong  path 
dependencies, which must have crystallised at around the time a country’s legal 
origin was determined—for most developing countries, at around the time of 
their colonisation by England or France—and never have been susceptible to 
change since. However, it is unclear why the legal system should produce such 
strong lock-in effects.  
 
Alternative, ‘political’ explanations assert that the structure of corporate and 
commercial law is better explained by political economy than by legal origins 
(Roe, 2003; Gourevich and Shinn, 2005). In relation to developed nations, Roe 
(2003) argues that social democratic governments enact laws favouring labour. 
Strong labour groups prompt concentrated share ownership as a means ensuring 
shareholders are able to coordinate in bargaining with employees over corporate 
rents.  However  to  date,  less  work  has  been  done  in  this  vein  in  relation  to   7 
developing  countries,  save  to  show  that  political  instability  is  negatively 
associated with economic development (Roe and Siegel, 2007).  
 
A related claim discerns a link between economic and financial structure (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Carlin and Mayer, 2002). Certain forms of financial contract 
complement  more  effectively  particular  types  of  industry:  debt  is  suited  to 
manufacturing,  where  there  are  hard  assets  to  pledge  as  collateral;  whereas 
equity  is  more  appropriate  for  high-growth  sectors  where  assets  are  less 
tangible.  Allen  et  al  (2006a)  present  results  from  cross-country  regressions 
indicating that bank (debt) finance is more prevalent in countries dominated by 
physical-asset intensive industries. This literature might readily be linked with 
the ‘political’ account canvassed above, in that dominant industrial structures 
are likely to be reflected in powerful interest groups who may be expected to 
influence  the  course  of  law  reform.  Industrial  structure,  therefore,  may  be 
expected to be an input to law reform. 
 
The foregoing survey of the literature leaves many questions unanswered. Case 
study research, which is particularly useful for identifying mechanisms, may be 
able to shed some light upon these. India, a developing country with a common 
law system, approximately one-sixth of the world’s population,
4 and one of the 
world’s  fastest-growing  economies,
5  is  undoubtedly  a  significant  case  to 
understand. In the rest of this paper, we explore the way in which its recent 
spurt  of  economic  development  has  been  linked  to  legal  and  political 
institutions. In particular, we focus on whether (i) ‘adaptable’ legal rules framed 
by  the  judiciary  and/or  (ii)  a  politically  independent  judiciary  have  assisted 
economic  development;  and  (iii)  the  extent  to  which,  if  at  all,  the  current 
configuration of Indian corporate governance is a consequence of its political 
and economic, as opposed to legal, history.  
 
 
3. The Indian pattern of corporate governance and finance 
 
In  this  section,  we  give  an  overview  of  India’s  current  pattern  of  corporate 
governance and finance. We then explore how this is related to its corporate and 
bankruptcy laws.   
 
3.1 The pattern of India’s industrial development 
 
India  is,  compared  to  similarly-situated  developing  countries,  said  to  be 
relatively  weak  in  labour-intensive  manufacturing,  strong  in  skill-intensive 
manufacturing, and strong in services and high-tech sectors (Topalova, 2004;   8 
Kochhar et al, 2006). To a large extent, this flows from policies adopted during 
the socialist era of central planning, following independence in 1947 until the 
early 1980s. In particular, planners pursued policies seeking (i) to develop self-
sufficiency through import substitution and restrictions on capital flows; (ii) to 
channel  scarce  domestic  capital  into  large-scale,  capital-intensive  ‘national 
champion’ firms; (iii) to deter the formation of large-scale private sector firms--
which might compete for such capital--by discriminating in favour of small-
scale  private  enterprise;  and  (iv)  to  foster  the  development  of  home-grown 
human  capital  through  investment  in  education.  Under  this  regime, 
manufacturing firms were subject to a plethora of regulatory controls over their 
operations  which  were  nicknamed  the  ‘licence  Raj’  on  account  of  their 
similarity to the arbitrary power formerly wielded by the British.  
  
Kochhar et al (2006) argue that this distinctive policy mix resulted in a relative 
underdevelopment of private sector large-scale manufacturing industry in India 
by the early 1980s, and a comparatively high degree of specialisation in private-
sector services, which required less capital investment. As the manufacturing 
sector struggled to develop, the heavy state investments in tertiary education 
had produced by the 1980s many more qualified engineers than there were jobs 
(Athreye, 2005). At the same time, however, services and software firms were 
starting to grow rapidly. The licence Raj extended only to firms manufacturing 
tangible assets, leaving services firms and software manufacturers outside its 
ambit  (Khanna  and  Papelu,  2005;  Athreye,  2005)  and  giving  them  greater 
freedom to innovate. When constraints on the private sector were relaxed from 
the early 1990s onwards, there were therefore relatively many highly-skilled 
workers  and  an  emerging  specialisation  in  services.  Seemingly  as  a  result, 
India’s subsequent pattern of development has seen dramatic growth fuelled by 
the services sector and skill-intensive manufacturing, whilst the country still 
remains  relatively  under-developed—as  compared  with  other  countries  at  a 
similar stage of development—in terms of labour-intensive manufacturing.  
 
3.2 The structure of India’s financial markets 
 
The availability of outside finance is particularly important from the point of 
view of growth. If external finance is unavailable, firms are forced to rely on 
internal funds. Yet firms which are new entrants to global markets will struggle 
to generate the profits necessary to fund projects from retained earnings (Shirai, 
2004).  Thus  constraints  on  outside  finance  may  retard  growth.  The  role  of 
institutions  which  support  and  facilitate  the  provision  of  outside  finance  is 
therefore particularly salient. By developed country standards, Indian firms tend 
to be highly reliant on retained earnings and informal networks of family and   9 
friends as sources of finance, implying that there are indeed  limitations in the 
supply of external finance (Allen et al, 2006b). Yet as we shall see, relative to 
similarly  situated  developing  countries,  India’s  equity  markets  are  highly 
developed. As regards debt finance, overall private lending is slightly below the 
level  in  comparable  developing  countries,  and  markets  for  publicly-traded 
corporate debt (bonds) are virtually non-existent.. 
 
Table 1 lists certain key indicators for stock markets in various countries around 
the  world,  both  developed  and  developing.  As  can  be  seen,  India  has  an 
extraordinarily  high  number  of  listed  companies—second  only  to  the  US. 
However, their average market capitalisation is relatively small. Moreover, the 
‘depth’  of  India’s  equity  markets—as  measured  by  the  ratio  of  market 
capitalisation to GDP--is higher than that for comparable developing countries 
such as China, or indeed for many developed countries, including Germany. 
 
 
Table 1: Selected stock market indicators, 2005 
 
  US  UK  Japan  Germany  Singapore  Hong 
Kong 
China  India 
Listed 
companies 








139.7  151.9  100.0  48.2  198.4  548.3  40.3  82.2 
Turnover 
($bn) 
21,510  4,167  4,997  1,763  120  460  586  443 
Turnover 
ratio (%) 
129.1  141.9  118.8  146.0  63.1  49.3  82.5  94.2 











   10 
Table 2 shows the rapid development of India’s stock markets during the 1990s. 
It presents data on the evolution of equity market depth—as measured by the 
ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP—for India as compared to high, 
middle and lower income countries around the world. As can be seen, India’s 
equity  markets  were  relatively  thin  at  the  start  of  the  period,  having  only  a 
slightly higher ratio than that for low income  countries generally. However, 
there was rapid growth during the 1990s, with the result that by 2002, India’s 
market capitalisation ratio exceeded that of middle income countries generally, 
where it has since remained.  
 
 
Table 2: Market capitalisation ratio of world stock markets, 1990-2005 
 
Markets  Market capitalisation/ % GDP 
  1990  2000  2002  2003  2004  2005 
High 
income 
51.6  120.6  83.4  100.1  108.9  112.9 
Middle 
income 
19.4  41.2  35.3  44.5  43.7  49.5 
Low  & 
Middle 
income 
18.8  38.7  33.3  43.5  43.8  50.1 
Low 
income 
9.8  23.6  22.6  37.3  44.5  54.2 
India  12.2  32.4  25.7  46.5  56.1  68.6 
World  48.0  105.1  74.6  89.7  96.3  99.6 
         Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2006). 
 
 
Figure 1 plots the relationship between outside equity and outside debt markets 
for selected Asian countries in 2004. It shows that whilst India’s equity markets 
are  comparable  with  the  stronger  economies  in  the  region,  its  outside  debt 
markets (that is, markets for corporate bonds) are considerably more shallow. 
Whilst external debt finance is generally underdeveloped in India, relative to 
comparable economies,  India’s bond markets are particularly weak (Farrell et 
al, 2006; Asuncion-Mund, 2007).
6  
 
Aggregate  debt-to-equity  levels  in  India’s  corporate  sector  have  decreased 
during the period since liberalisation, in line with the relative development of 
stock markets, as compared with markets for debt finance (Topalova, 2004). 
This trend is also evidenced in firm-level data. Figure 2 shows the liabilities (as 
indicated by historic cost measures on balance sheets) of Indian firms during the 
period 1990-2001. As can be seen, the proportion represented by equity funds   11 
have grown during this period, with a corresponding decline in that representing 




Figure 1: Debt and Equity Market capitalisation (% GDP), 2004 
 
Source: Farrell et al, 2006 
 
Figure 2: Balance Sheet Liabilities of Indian Firms, 1990-2001 
Source: Shirai (2004)   12 
Similarly,  as  regards  flow-of-funds  measures,  Table  3  indicates  that  Indian 
firms relied heavily on internal sources (retained earnings and current liabilities) 
when raising new finance during the 1990s and early 2000s (see Shirai, 2002; 
Allen et al, 2006). When external finance is raised, the principal sources were 
(in order): bank loans, outside equity, and bond issues. However, for smaller 
firms,  whilst the external finance raised was relatively greater, less use was 
made of debt finance. Moreover, amongst smaller firms, those in the services 
sector  rely  less  on  debt  finance  (particularly  bank  finance)  than  do 
manufacturing firms. This greater reliance on equity finance is also pronounced 
for software firms (see Shirai, 2002; Love and Peria, 2004).  
 
 
Table 3: Sources of New Funds for Non-Financial Indian Firms (% total 
funding, 1990-2004) 
 
Private sector firms 
Small scale firms 





Overall  Listed 
firms 
Unlisted 
firms  Manufacturing  Services 
Retained earnings  36.3  42.0  33.1  35.0  28.8  6.4  12.5 
Equity    13.3  8.5  16.1  15.7  16.6  29.2  27.7 
Bonds  4.5  4.1  4.8  4.3  5.8  2.0  0.9 
Banks/FIs  15.9  11.5  19.0  19.7  17.3  9.4  -8.7 
Groups/Insiders/Directors  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.3  1.3  2.1  1.0 
Liabilities & provisions  29.1  32.7  26.3  25.0  30.0  50.9  66.6 
 
Source: Allen et al (2006b). 
 
As might be expected, riskier firms—as proxied by age and size—appear to 
raise less outside finance than average (Shirai, 2002; Love and Peria, 2004). 
However, Shirai (2002) reports that the use of outside equity by riskier firms 
has increased significantly since 1990, indicating that developments in the stock 
markets  have  assisted  such  firms  in  raising  finance.  A  similar  pattern  of 
development has not, however, been present in credit markets. Whilst banks 
have become more willing to extend credit, this appears to have been across the 
spectrum of borrower types (Shirai, 2002), with the result that access to credit 
by the more risky firms has not proportionately increased. Moreover, India’s 
bond  markets  appear  to  be  underdeveloped,  with  there  being  relatively  few 
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It is interesting to note that the relative strengths of India’s financial markets 
complement  the  areas  of  comparative  advantage  in  industry.  Firms  without 
tangible  assets—such  as  the  service  industry  firms  in  which  India  is 
specialising—do  not  have  assets  to  offer  as  collateral,  and  so  do  not  lend 
themselves to raising debt finance. Rather, equity is a more appropriate source 
of outside finance. India’s peculiarly high level of corporate access to outside 
equity therefore complements the emphasis on tertiary industries. 
 
This claim bears further elaboration. To be sure, the ‘pecking order’ theory of 
corporate finance suggests that debt is likely to be the outside financial contract 
of choice for entrepreneurs. This is because, unlike outside equity, debt does not 
involve  an  immediate  allocation  of  control  rights  to  outsiders,  and  the 
entrepreneur therefore remains in control of their firm. However, debt is not 
well suited to high-tech manufacturing or services firms, in which much of the 
value is likely to be tied up in growth opportunities (see Armour, 2003). Firms 
developing new technologies or client bases commonly do not generate steady 
cash flows that can be used to make interest payments, and lack liquid assets 
that could be used as collateral. Instead, the value (if any) of such a firm will 
inhere in the ideas and ‘human capital’ of the entrepreneur and opportunities for 
growth.  This  makes  such  firms  unsuitable  candidates  for  debt  investment 
(Berger  and  Udell,  1998;  Carpenter  and  Petersen,  2002).  Rather,  there  is  a 
strong complementarity between ‘soft’ assets and concentrated equity finance, 
in the form of venture capital. Empirical findings confirm that equity financing, 
and  not  debt,  predominates  in  privately-held  firms  in  technology-intensive 
industries (Freear and Wetzel, 1990; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  
 
Much of the outside equity raised by high-tech firms in the US  and UK is 
sourced from private equity funds—in the form of venture capital—rather than 
raised  directly  from  stock  markets.  However,  the  success  of  venture  capital 
markets is in turn thought to be associated with the existence of deep and liquid 
stock markets (Black and Gilson, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000). The intuition is 
that entrepreneurs are more willing to enter into a contract ceding control to an 
outside investor (private equity) if they have the ‘carrot’ of the possibility of 
their  regaining  (effective)  control  of  the  firm  after  an  IPO.  However,  many 
Indian firms simply go direct to the capital markets, without going through a 
VC  stage,  as  is  evidenced  by  the  extraordinarily  high  number  of  listed 
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3.3 India’s legal system and investor protection laws 
 
3.3.1 General background 
 
Although  India  is  described  as  a  common  law  country,  having  inherited  a 
common  law  legal  system  from  the  British,  many  of  its  laws  were  in  fact 
codified  during  British  rule.
9  This  was  then  overlaid  with  further  legislation 
when,  in  post-independence  India,  the  government  implemented  a  socialist 
reform  agenda  in  encompassing  all  areas  of  commercial  activity,  including 
corporate finance.  
 
Table 4 elaborates the principal legislation in the sphere of company law and 
investor  protection  prior  to  India’s  liberalisation  in  1991.  Together,  these 
measures established a tightly-controlled regime covering almost all aspects of 
corporate management, including the raising of outside finance.  Controls on 
finance took effect both through the nationalisation of banks and controls on the 
raising of debt and equity finance on public markets, with additional restrictions 
on trading in secondary markets. Moreover, both the public-sector banks and 
the  remaining  privately-owned  banks  were  required  to  lend  at  subsidised 
interest rates to ‘national champion’ industries.  
 
In an environment in which banks are used as a means of channelling subsidies 
to firms favoured by central planning policies, debt does not impose a hard 
budget constraint on borrower firms. It is therefore not surprising that the pre-
liberalisation  environment  lacked  an  effective  means  of  enforcing  debt 
contracts.  For  the  recovery  of  unpaid  debts,  and  even  the  enforcement  of 
security  interests,  there  were  few  options  other  than  filing  a  suit  before  the 
courts. However, the very long delays typical in the Indian courts significantly 
undermined  the  legal  protection  of  creditors.
10  Moreover,  India’s  corporate 
insolvency laws were also notoriously weak.
 On the one hand, the Companies 
Act 1956 contains no effective procedure for corporate restructuring allowing 
renegotiations whilst the firm continues to trade (see Batra, 2003). Coupling an 
inadequate substantive law with the delays associated with litigation in Indian 
courts  resulted  in  winding-ups  typically  taking  upwards  of  ten  years  to 
complete, with delays of over 50 years being not unheard-of (Goswami, 2002).    15 
Table 4: Principal Components of the Regulatory Framework for Indian 





Established a legal regime requiring Government permission for 
issuing capital and regulating the price of new issues of equity by 




The main legislation governing the establishment, operation and 
management of companies. Confers a variety of powers on the central 
government (exercised through the Department of Companies Affairs 
via the Company Law Board or the Registrar of Companies) and the 






Provides for control of virtually all aspects of securities trading, 
including the running of stock exchanges with an aim to prevent 
undesirable transactions in securities. Gives Central Government 
regulatory jurisdiction over stock exchanges through a process of 
recognition and continued supervision, contracts in securities, and 
listing of securities on stock exchanges. Stock exchanges can frame 
their own listing regulations within the consonance with minimum 






Enacted to prevent concentration of economic power in the hands of 
private companies; to provide for the control of monopolies and 
prohibit monopolistic and restrictive trade practices.  Amongst other 
things, it has been said to be one of the main barriers preventing Indian 





A controversial law regulating dealings and transactions involving 
foreign exchange - any contravention amounted to a criminal offence, 
punishable with imprisonment and severe fines (up to 5x the amount 
involved), there was a presumption of criminal intent, and the statute 
contained no provision guaranteeing legal assistance to the accused. 
The Office of Directorate of Enforcement responsible for enforcement 
had wide powers for arresting, conducting search and seizure and 
prosecuting people under the act. There were several restrictions on 
dealing in foreign exchange, for instance, on drawal of foreign 
exchange for current account transactions and on transactions in foreign 




Enacted to protect financially distressed, or ‘sick’ companies. Imposes 
a moratorium on the payment of creditors and control of the company 
passes to an administrative agency, the BFIR. The focus of the regime 
is on preserving employment and it is widely perceived that failing 
firms are kept open unnecessarily long in order to avoid immediate job 
losses.  
   16 
The Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA) was enacted in 1985 to provide an 
improved means for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of distressed (‘sick’) 
firms.
11 Its innovation was to institute a general stay of creditors’ claims, but at 
the same time to transfer control of a distressed firm not to the courts, but to a 
new administrative agency, the Board for Industrial Financial Reconstruction 
(BIFR).  However,  the  BIFR  seems  to  have  performed  little  better  than  the 
courts, has itself generated considerable delay and expense, with relatively few 
successful recoveries of distressed firms.
12   
 
The  liberalising  New  Economic  Policy  of  1991  lead  to  a  dramatic 
reconfiguration  of  the  economy.  The  motivating  idea  was  to  move  from  an 
economy controlled and planned by the state to one in which the private sector 
was  to  have  a  significant  role,  competition  was  to  be  encouraged,  market-
oriented mechanisms were to be developed and government intervention was to 
be limited to the extent justifiably required (Bhagwati 1993; Panagria 2004: 10). 
Widespread legal reforms were associated with this shift, including in the field 
of investor protection.
13 In the financial sector, the reforms were particularly 
wide-ranging  in  relation  to  equity  markets.  In  contrast,  reforms  relating  to 
creditor  rights,  insolvency  and  debt  markets  have  been  either  delayed  or 
insignificant.  
 
The  first  significant  aspect  of  the  reforms  has  been  the  relaxation  of  the 
restrictive legislation that formed the legal basis for state control during the pre-
liberalisation era. Thus, of the five pieces of legislation described in Table 4, 
one (CICA) was repealed outright, another (FERA) was entirely replaced by a 
more liberal statutory regime (the Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 or 
‘FEMA’),
14 and three others (SCRA MRTP, and SICA)
15 have been amended 
with a view to reducing governmental control of the activities on the securities 
markets and increasing competition. Finally, whilst the Companies Act 1956 
remains  the  primary  legislation  governing  the  establishment,  operation  and 
management of companies and also winding up or liquidation,
16 several changes 
have also been made to this Act, mostly with a view to relaxing government 
controls and giving more freedom to companies to manage their own affairs.
17 
 
3.3.2 Reforms relating to equity finance 
 
Rapid  and  wide-ranging  legislative  efforts  were  made  after  liberalisation  to 
foster the development of Indian securities markets (Shah and Thomas, 2001; 
Thomas,  2006).  Principal  amongst  these  was  the  replacement  of  central 
government  control  over  stock  exchanges  with  an  SEC-style  independent 
regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’). With the repeal   17 
of  the  CICA  in  May  1992  and  with  it  the  abolition  of  requirement  of 
Government permission for companies issuing capital and Government control 
over the pricing of new issues of equity, a market oriented independent entity to 
regulate the securities market was deemed necessary. SEBI had initially been 
established in 1988 as an advisory body; in 1992 the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) Act conferred statutory authority upon it as a unified 
securities  regulator.  Following  SEBI’s  establishment  as  an  independent 
statutory authority, the focus shifted to establishing a regulatory framework to 
ensure  transparency  of  trading  practices,  speedy  settlement  procedures, 
enforcement  of  prudential  norms  and  full  disclosure  for  investor  protection, 
rather than the prior emphasis Government intervention and control (Ahluwalia, 
1995). Crucially, SEBI’s constitutive statute gave it power to produce binding 
regulations,  which  power  it  has  exercised  in  a  number  of  fields,  including 
disclosure requirements,
18 the introduction of corporate governance rules (the 
so-called “Clause 49” of the Listing Agreement),
19 a takeover law,
20 and the 
prohibition of insider trading.
21  
 
The establishment of SEBI was the single most influential event in the reforms 
of the securities market. It was soon followed by the establishment of a new 
securities exchange, the National Stock Exchange (‘NSE’) in 1992,
22 the first 
clearing  corporation–National  Securities  Clearing  Corporation  Ltd 
(‘NSCCL’)—in  1995,
23  and  an  independent  depository  called  National 
Securities Depository Limited (‘NSDL’) in 1996, following the passage of the 
Depositories Act in 1996.
24 These new and independent institutions provide the 
necessary modern infrastructure for the now fast-growing Indian stock markets. 
Moreover, the advent of competition between stock exchanges lead to the rapid 
adoption  of  a  number  of  innovative  technologies.  For  instance,  the  NSE 
introduced a nation-wide on-line fully-automated screen based trading system, 
and  in  its  first  year  of  operation  became  the  leading  stock  exchange  in  the 
country.
25  The  incumbent  Bombay  Stock  Exchange  (‘BSE’),  which  had 
previously enjoyed a comfortable monopoly, was forced to follow suit shortly 
afterwards, resulting in the disappearance from India of the old open outcry 
trading  system.  The  NSE  has  introduced  a  number  of  other  technological 
innovations,    which  the  BSE  has  subsequently  adopted  (Shah  and  Thomas, 
1996, 1999).
 26  
 
Another important development has been the increase in market participants. 
Following liberalisation, Indian stock markets have been opened to investment 
by foreign institutional investors (‘FIIs’),  Overseas Corporate Bodies (‘OCBs’) 
and non-resident Indians (‘NRIs’), who have been allowed to invest extensively 
in Indian companies. Moreover, FIIs have been permitted to invest in all types   18 
of  Indian  securities–including  Government  securities—and  enjoy  full  capital 
convertibility (Mohan, 2004).  
 
3.3.3 Reforms relating to debt finance 
 
On the other hand, reforms affecting the banking sector and creditor protection 
have  achieved  comparatively  limited  success.  A  range  of  banking  sector 
reforms initiated in 1992 were designed to liberalise the sector, to increase the 
financial stability of banks, and to increase competition in the sector—which up 
to  that  point  had  been  subject  to  a  near-monopoly  from  the  public  sector 
(Khatkhate,  2002;  Ahluwalia,  2002;  Mohan  2004,  2006)  To  be  sure,  these 
reforms have resulted in some increase in market participants and associated 
competition from private and foreign banks now permitted to operate in India. 
However, it is still difficult to obtain permissions to start a bank; moreover it is 
necessary for both foreign and domestic banks to obtain permission from the 
Reserve  Bank  of  India  (‘RBI’)  to  open  a  branch,  and  a  patchwork  of  rules 
persist  that  favour  public  sector  and  domestic  banks  over  foreign  entrants 
(Thomas, 2006). Nevertheless, the pre-liberalisation legal framework for credit 
agreements, which made it difficult for creditors to enforce their claims, and 
prioritised the interests of distressed companies over those of their creditors, has 
not changed with anything like the speed, or to the extent, that has occurred in 
relation  to  the  legal  institutions  underpinning  equity  markets.  (Ahluwalia, 
2002).  
 
The first step to improve the situation was the passage of the Recovery of Debts 
Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993 (the ‘RDDB Act’).  Pursuant 
to  the  RDDB  Act,  the  Government  could  set  up  Debt  Recovery  Tribunals 
(‘DRTs’) for recovery of debts due to banks or financial institutions of not less 
than Rs1m.
 But the RDDB Act was subject to legal challenge on constitutional 
grounds, forcing the DRTs to cease activities.
27 Whilst an interim order of the 
Supreme Court allowed the DRTs to resume functions from March 1996, it was 
not until 2002 that the RDDB Act was finally approved in a form compatible 
with  the  Court’s  requirements.  Whilst  the  Supreme  Court  of  India  has 
commented in a recent decision on the ‘limited success’ of the DRTs,
28 Visaria 
(2006)  reports  empirical  findings  that  their  introduction  has  been  associated 
with a reduction in loan delinquency rates.  
 
A second major legal reform relating to creditor rights was the Securitisation 
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests 
Act  2002  (‘SARFAESI’).  In  a  bid  to  bypass  the  delays  associated  with 
enforcement  through  Indian  courts,  this  legislation  empowered  banks  and   19 
financial  institutions  to  enforce  security  interests  extra-judicially.
29  In 
particular,  such  creditors  are  thereby  permitted  to  seize  and  sell  collateral 
without recourse to courts if a default is not remedied within 60 days. In a 
pattern that echoed the experience in relation to the RDDB Act, certain aspects 
of  the  extra-judicial  enforcement  regime  introduced  by  SARFAESI  were 
challenged on constitutional grounds.
30 After a judicial review by the Supreme 
Court, the Act’s constitutional validity was generally upheld in 2004, save for 
certain parts that were accordingly amended in 2005.
31  
 
It appears that SARFAESI’s grant to banks of a right of enforcement without 
court intervention has had a significant impact on lending practices. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that, as might be expected, it has reduced the time involved in 
enforcing collateral and has strengthened the bargaining power of banks and FIs 
in  negotiations  over  defaults  (World  Bank,  2007).
32  Moreover,  Vig  (2007) 
reports  that  SARFAESI’s  introduction  is  associated  with  a  decrease  in  the 
average amount of collateral offered by firms. This is consistent with studies 
from developed countries that find stronger creditor rights to be associated with 
lower levels of collateralisation (Davydenko and Franks, 2008): inframarginal 
firms need offer less security, whereas at the margin additional borrowers are 
able to obtain access to secured credit.   
 
SARFAESI  also  established  a  regime  regulating  the  securitisation  and 
reconstruction of financial assets.
33 This has given lenders and alternative exit 
route  from  distressed  loans—sale  to  an  investment  entity  specialising  in 
distressed debt, as opposed to enforcement.  In July 2005, the RBI authorised 
the  sale  or  purchase  of  non-performing  assets  by  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions in return for cash consideration. From November 2005, it also paved 
way for foreign investment in such assets by allowing foreign direct investment 
to comprise up to 49% of the equity capital of asset reconstruction companies or 
securitisation companies set up to purchase non-performing loans from banks. 
These have enabled such companies to finance the acquisition distressed debt 
afford a clean exit to the sellers. According to our interviewees, this innovation 
has had a positive impact on the provision of debt finance in India, by freeing up 
bank capital for fresh loans. 
 
Thus, with respect to the enforcement of bank debt and security interests, the 
RDDB  Act  and  SARFAESI  represent  limited  but  positive  steps  forward. 
However,  these  statutory  provisions  apply  only  to  debts  due  to  banks  and 
financial  institutions,  and  are  not  available  to  ordinary  creditors.  Thus,  an 
ordinary  creditor  wishing  to  enforce  a  debt  has  no  option  but  to  pursue  the 
debtor before ordinary civil courts, with the associated long delays. The RDDB   20 
Act and SARFAESI may therefore be expected to have had little or no impact 
on bond markets, where investors need not be banks or financial institutions. 
 
Insolvency law is the aspect of creditor rights in relation to which least progress 
has  been  achieved  to  date:  according  to  World  Bank  measures,  Indian 
insolvency law continues to be amongst the least effective in the world (World 
Bank, 2007).
34 Following the recommendations of an expert committee,
35 the 
government  passed  the  Companies  (Second  Amendment)  Act,  2002  (the 
‘Second Amendment’) which amongst others things sought to introduce new 
provisions  to  the  Companies  Act  1956  scheme  pertaining  to  corporate 
reorganisation  (Batra,  2003)  Concomitantly,  the  Sick  Industrial  Companies 
(Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 was passed to repeal the SICA regime. 
Whilst the new provisions of the Second Amendment for reorganisation are 
modelled on the provisions of SICA, and the powers of the BIFR transferred to 
new tribunals called the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’), the Second 
Amendment  has  made  an  effort  to  avoid  the  most  obvious  shortcomings  of 
SICA. For instance, it does not contain the much abused statutory moratorium 
under  SICA,  the  definition  of  ‘sick’ness  has  been  improved  under  the  new 
provisions, and the NCLTs will be constituted of qualified people to preside 
over rehabilitation and liquidation matters. Yet it is doubtful whether the change 
is  sufficiently  significant  for  the  Second  Amendment  to  make  a  significant 
impact on corporate debt markets. Not only is the Second Amendment far from 
perfect (see Batra, 2003; World Bank, 2007), but a range of other legal rules--
such as labour laws,
36 industrial relations, and even certain land laws,
37 also 
impede the restructuring or closure of distressed undertakings (see also Joshi 
and Little, 1996: 208-217).  
 
The  Second  Amendment  has  also  faced  constitutional  legal  challenge.  The 
Madras High Court ruled some of its provisions unconstitutional in 2004, and 
stayed the operation of the Amendment until suitable changes were made.
38 The 
central government filed a special leave petition to the Supreme Court against 
this decision. We were informed by the Ministry of Company Affairs that the 
Supreme Court has not given a judgment in the matter, as the Government has 
agreed  to  take  the  issues  raised  in  the  Madras  High  Court’s  decision  into 
account and make appropriate amendments. Therefore, amendments to the Act 
are expected to be brought forth but in the meanwhile, the NCLT tribunals have 
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3.3.4 Summary 
 
The restrictive legal regime imposed on companies during the central planning 
era  has  been  deregulated  following  liberalisation,  and  new  legal  institutions 
have been introduced to facilitate the raising of corporate finance. However, 
India’s pattern of legal reforms has, to date, been more successful as regards 
shareholders  than  as  regards  creditors.  The  early  establishment  of  a  new 
independent securities regulator, SEBI, with power to pass delegated legislation, 
has  seen  a  rapid  and  responsive  development  of  a  regulatory  regime  for 
shareholder protection. In contrast, however, the reform strategy for creditor 
rights has depended largely upon primary legislation, which has seen lengthy 
delays  owing  first  to  the  cross-currents  of  coalition  politics,  and  then  to 
constitutional challenges before the courts by affected interest groups.  
 
3.4 Complementarities between law and finance 
 
Three issues have been discussed in this section: the pattern of India’s industrial 
development; the pattern of financing for Indian firms, and the development of 
legal institutions supporting external finance. It seems plausible to suggest that 
there  are  complementarities  between  the  three  patterns.  Stronger  legal 
institutions  for  equity  investors  are  associated  with,  by  comparison  with 
similarly situated countries, relatively high levels of equity investment; this in 
turn complements a pattern of industrial development specialising in services, 
software  and  high-tech  manufacturing,  sectors  naturally  complemented  by 
equity, rather than debt, finance. The identification of this configuration poses 
obvious  questions  about  the  links  between  legal  institutions  and  industrial 
development. The difficulty with looking for direct links between the quality of 
investor  protection  laws,  corporate  financing  patterns  and  the  pattern  of 
industrial specialisation is that there are likely to be significant feedback effects, 
with each factor being endogenous.  Accepting this problem, the literature has 
sought  to  look  for  exogenous  (possibly  instrumental)  variables.  On  the  one 
hand, the ‘legal origins’ claim asserts that the civil or common law status of a 
country’s  legal  system  influences  the  quality  of  its  laws  and  hence, 
development; on the other, a range of ‘political’ claims assert that the structure 
of  government  and  configuration  of  interest  groups  are  determinants  of  the 
quality of substantive legal rules. The next two sections explore the applicability 
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4. What role did India’s ‘legal origin’ play? 
 
As discussed in section 2, the ‘legal origins’ view asserts that the historically-
determined  structure  of  a  country’s  legal  system—into  one  of  the  civil  or 
common law ‘legal origins’—is a determinant of the quality of micro-level legal 
institutions  that  facilitate  corporate  finance.  Common  law  legal  origins  are 
thought to lead to superior legal institutions through two particular channels: 
first, the relative ‘adaptability’ of judge-made, as opposed to codified, private 
law;  and  secondly,  the  relative  independence  of  common  law  judges  from 
politics, resulting in a reduced tendency towards rent-seeking behaviour on their 
part. We now examine whether, and to what extent, India’s status as a common 
law country affected matters through each of these two channels. 
 
4.1.1 Judicial law-making and ‘adaptability’ 
 
The ‘adaptability’ thesis, it will be recalled, asserts that common law systems 
derive a comparative advantage in innovating legal rules (to respond to changed 
environmental or technological circumstances) through the use of judge-made, 
as opposed to codified, laws. Judicial law-making results in an emergent, rather 
than a planned, system of rules, in which one aspect may change at a time 
without implications for the coherence of the body of rules as a whole. If this 
were an accurate account, we would expect to see rapid development of judicial 
rules  following  significant  environmental  or  technological  changes.  Post-
liberalisation  India  therefore  makes  a  good  test  case,  as  the  relaxation  of 
government  controls  on  finance  from  1991  onwards  created  scope  for 
significant financial innovation. However, as we shall see, judicial law-making 
had little or no part to play in this process in India. 
 
The defining feature of the Indian court system is the staggering delays involved 
in resolving a case by trial, which typically would take up to 20 years (Debroy, 
2000).
39 As of February 2007, there were over 41,000 cases pending before the 
Supreme Court,
40 and as of August 2006, nearly 4 million before all the High 
Courts, and approximately 25.5 million before all the District Courts.
41 Tables 5 
and 6, respectively, give figures for pendency of cases before the various High 
Courts and District Courts.
42 With a backlog of this magnitude, it is simply not 
possible for India’s judges, even if they are activist and willing to update the 
legal rules in response to changes in the real economy, to act as agents of legal 
change in a way that responds anything like quickly enough to keep up with the 
galloping pace of economic change. 
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Name of the High 
Court 
As on  Civil cases  Criminal 
cases 
Total 
  1  Allahabad  30.6.06  584499  207651  792150 
  2  A.P.  30.6.06  216433  21239  237672 
  3  Bombay  31.5.06  320840  37191  358031 
  4  Calcutta  30.6.06  227485  37887  265372 
  5  Delhi  30.5.06  95589  30923  126512 
  6  Gujarat  31.12.05  100488  30897  131385 
  7  Gauhati  30.6.06  52418  6900  59318 
  8  H.P.  30.6.06  10934  5993  25027 
  9  Jammu & Kashmir  31.12.05  39529  2444  41973 
10  Karnataka  30.6.06  77697  13732  91429 
11  Kerala  30.6.06  101374  24677  126051 
12  Madras  30.6.06  339157  31754  370911 
13  M.P.  31.12.05  130259  55759  186018 
14  Orissa  30.6.06  193186  17254  210440 
15  Patna  31.12.05  66549  25033  91582 
16  Punjab & Haryana  31.12.05  201151  42320  243471 
17  Rajasthan  31.12.05  158318  47867  206185 
18  Sikkim  30.6.06  47  11  58 
19  Uttaranchal  30.6.06  31518  7422  38940 
20  Chattisgarh  30.6.06  52355  24038  76393 
21  Jharkhand  30.6.06  47066  231032  278098 
  Total    3054992  902024  3957016 
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Table 6: Pendency in the District Courts, as of 7.8.2006 
 
SI. No.  Name of 
States/UTs. 




1  Andhra Pradesh  30.6.06  501335  474843  976178 
2  Arunachal Pradesh  31.12.05  847  6410  7257 
3  Assam  31.12.05  49633  141195  190828 
4  Bihar  30.6.05  230159  1047533  1277692 
5  Chhartisgarh  30.6.05  49557  210045  259602 
6  Goa  31.12.05  20644  13671  34315 
7  Gujarat  30.6.06  783662  3152284  3935946 
8  Haryana  31.12.05  202525  304323  506848 
9  H.P.  31.12.05  64336  113080  177416 
10  J & K  31.12.04  48132  83812  131944 
11  Jharkhand  30.6.05  52709  243316  296025 
12  Karnataka  30.6.06  569322  516736  1086058 
13  Kerala  30.6.06  420549  506746  927295 
14  M.P.  31.12.05  194240  758738  952978 
15  Maharashtra  31.12.05  748760  2579121  3327881 
16  Manipur  31.12.05  3304  1812  5116 
17  Meghalaya  31.12.05  4193  6979  11172 
18  Mizoram  30.6.05  1935  5952  7887 
19  Nagaland  31.12.05  1018  3076  4094 
20  Orissa  30.6.05  180632  799404  980036 
21  Punjab  31.12.05  247927  312529  560456 
22  Rajasthan  31.12.05  293220  757154  1050374 
23  Sikkim  30.6.06  187  437  624 
24  Tamil Nadu  30.6.06  438488  436450  874938 
25  Tripura  31.12.05  6983  25899  32882 
26  Uttah Pradesh  31.12.05  1188440  3552101  4740541 
27  Uttaranchal  31.12.05  26222  99634  125856 
28  West Bengal  31.12.05  512947  1428280  1941227 
29  A & N Island  31.12.05  1291  46385  47676 
30  Chandigarh  31.12.05  20472  59522  79994 
31  D & N Haveli  30.6.04  550  2457  3007 
32  Daman & Diu  30.6.04  752  860  1612 
33  Delhi  30.6.06  140462  788064  928526 
34  Lakshadweep  30.6.04  75  45  120 
35  Pondicherry  30.6.06  12827  7698  20525 
  Total    7018335  18486591  25504926 
 
Source: Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Justice, available at 
http://mha.nic.in/rtijustice1.pdf 
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Several factors contribute to these extraordinary figures (see Krishnan, 2003; 
Narayan,  undated).  First,  India  has  relatively  few  judges  per  capita,  as 
illustrated by Table 7. Although these figures date principally from the mid-
1990s, there is no reason to believe that the picture has changed significantly. 
Not only are there relatively few judicial posts in India, but the posts which do 
exist often remain unoccupied (Debroy, 2000; Hazra and Micevska, 2004).  
 
Table 7: International Variation in Judges per Capita 
 
  Year  Judges  Judges per 
100,000 capita 
Common Law Countries       
USA  1998  28049  10.4 
England &  Wales  2001  3518  6.6 
Canada  1991  1817  6.5 
Malaysia  1990  274  1.6 
India  1995  9564  1.0 
Civil Law Countries       
Germany  1995  22134  27.1 
Denmark  1997  653  12.4 
France  1997  6287  10.7 
Taiwan  1995  1252  5.7 
S. Korea  1995  1212  2.7 
Japan  1999  2949  2.3 
 
Source: Galanter and Krishnan (2002). 
 
Secondly, procedural laws in India--particularly with respect to civil litigation–
facilitate delays and are often abused to frustrate genuine litigants. For instance, 
they  readily  allow  ‘interim  applications’,  ‘ad-interim  applications’  and 
adjournments, which readily permits a party wishing to prolong the proceedings 
to  do  so almost  indefinitely (Debroy,  2000;  Krishnan,  2003).
43  Furthermore, 
they create layers of rights to appeals and revision – another major cause of 
delay.
44  As one of our interviewees observed--‘it’s a defendant’s court’. These 
procedural laws generate negative synergies with the fee structure of litigation 
lawyers, who are paid by appearance, and so have an incentive to prolong the 




With a typical delay of 10 years or more until a lawsuit is resolved, it seems 
hardly  likely  that  judicial  innovation  in  lawmaking  can  have  been  the  main 
channel through which India’s substantive laws regarding investor protection 
were developed in the post-liberalisation era. This is not, of course, to say that 
no judicially-lead legal developments occurred; rather, it implies that those that   26 
did occur would have played, at best, a subsidiary role. One example where 
such innovation has occurred concerns the protection of minority shareholders 
under the Companies Act 1956. Under the 1956 Act minority shareholders are 
given  statutory  entitlements  to  protection  against  ‘oppression’,
46    and  also 
against ‘mismanagement’, a very open-ended term.
47 Since the provisions were 
enacted  in  1956,  the  Indian  courts  have  developed  a  rich  body  of  case  law 
precedents interpreting and applying these provisions.
48 However, the timescale 
is much longer, and the changes much more incremental, than the developments 
that have occurred since 1991.  
 
These  findings  challenge  the  notion  that  common  law  systems’  alleged 
advantages  in  terms  of  adaptability  give  them  an  inherent  advantage  for 
economic development. Where courts are chronically overworked—as is likely 
to be the case in many developing countries—then it is hard to see that they can 
be  motors  of  legal  reform.  In  contrast,  the  most  successful  mechanism  for 
producing  new  laws  in  India  has  been  delegation  to  regulators  with  quasi-
legislative power. Passing the mantle to technocratic committeeshas deflected 
political  attention  which  would  have  been  received  had  the  rules  been 
promulgated by primary legislation. The real engines for development of the 
legal  framework  of  corporate  finance  in  India  have  rather  been  specialist 
regulatory bodies such as SEBI, and, to a lesser extent, the Reserve Bank of 
India  (RBI).  This  casts  considerable  doubt  on  the  ideas  underlining  the 
adaptability hypothesis.  
 
4.1.2 Political independence and the protection of property rights 
 
We now turn to an alternative claim about the importance of ‘legal origins’, 
namely  the  ‘political’  thesis.  This  asserts  that  common  law  systems  grant 
relatively greater political independence to their judiciary, who are thus better 
positioned than their civilian brethren to protect citizens’ property rights from 
encroachment by the state.  
 
There  is  some  support  in  India’s  constitutional  history  for  the  idea  that  a 
politically independent judiciary can assist financial development. A politically 
independent  judiciary,  with  the  Supreme  Court  at  its  apex,  has  been  a  key 
feature of India’s democracy throughout the 57 years of its existence.
49 The role 
of the Supreme Court as the protector of individual rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution  of  India  as  ‘fundamental  rights’,
50  and  its  extensive  powers  of 
judicial review of legislative and executive actions, have been distinguishing 
features of the constitutional system in India. Indeed, scholars of constitutional 
law regard the Indian Supreme Court as having been exceptionally activist in   27 
responding to government intervention (see e.g., Allen, 2000).The judiciary--
through the Supreme Court—did, during the era of central planning, play an 
important role in protecting individual property rights from encroachment by 
the  state.  The  Constitution  of  India,  as  originally  drafted  following 
independence in 1947, provided for the protection of individual property as a 
fundamental right.
51 However, the newly independent government of India was 
keen to carry out drastic land reforms and redistribution of property in order to 
further social justice. This quickly led to tension between the government and 
the judiciary over the extent to which the legislature had power to engage in 
such redistribution of property rights. 
 
The saga began with the 1951 case of Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar,
52 in 
which the Patna High Court held that legislation that provided for the abolition 
of an age-old hierarchical system of ‘zamindari’ rights was unconstitutional.
53 
The legislature’s response was to pre-empt the Supreme Court from considering 
the  issue  by  introducing  the  First  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  India, 
which provided that certain laws listed in a new (and now notorious) Schedule 
IX to the Constitution were deemed to be beyond challenge on the ground of 
interference with fundamental rights.
54 
 
After  the  First  Amendment,  the  next  point  of  contest  became  the 
‘compensation’ payable on the compulsory acquisition of property by the state 
for public purposes. In the case of Bela Banerjee,
55 the Supreme Court adopted 
a creative approach, reading the word ‘compensation’ appearing in what was 
then Art 31(2) of the Constitution as meaning compensation which was a ‘just 
equivalent to the property acquired’, even in the absence of adjectives like ‘just’ 
or ‘adequate’. The legislature responded by amending the constitution again, 
this time to make the question of ‘adequacy of compensation’ non-justiciable.
56  
 
Despite  this  amendment  and  in  reaction  to  other  expansionary  legislative 
amendments of 1964,
57 the Supreme Court nevertheless subsequently came up 
with further ingenious ways to protect private property from public takings. For 
instance, in Vajravelu,
58 the Court held that whilst the question of adequacy of 
compensation  was  not  justiciable;  if  the  law  made  no  provision  for 
compensation, or if the compensation was illusory, the Court could nevertheless 
declare  the  law  invalid.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  Bank  Nationalization  in 
1969,
59 the Court declared the relevant law unconstitutional on the basis that it, 
‘failed  to  provide  expropriated  banks  with  compensation  determined  in 
accordance with the relevant principles provided by the law.’  
   28 
This  constitutional  back-and-forth  continued  into  the  1970s,  with  further 
constitutional  amendment  by  the  legislature  being  met  by  correspondingly 
expansive interpretation of the remaining provisions by the Supreme Court. An 
endgame appeared to have been reached during the Emergency period of 1975-
77,  which  was  the  height  of the  arrogation  of  executive  power.  During  this 
period the Court acceded to the government’s wish to suspend the protection of 
fundamental  constitutional  rights.  Furthermore,  when  the  Emergency 
suspension of rights ended in 1978, the legislature comprehensively amended 
the  constitution  so  as  to  remove  entirely  the  ‘right  to  property’  from  the 
category of fundamental rights.
60  
 
Although  ultimately  the  legislature  succeeded  in  putting  the  protection  of 
property rights beyond justiciability, it seems clear that the independent and 
activist judiciary delayed this process for some time. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court  became,  if  anything,  even  more  activist  in  its  interpretation  of  the 
Constitution of India following the end of the Emergency. It did so through a 
very liberal interpretation of its standing rules, The Court’s innovation was to 
relax  standing  requirements  so  as  to  permit  any  citizen  to  bring  a  petition 
alleging that a piece of legislation is unconstitutional, or that the government is 
failing to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, regardless of whether the 
citizen has any personal interest in the outcome (Desai and Muralidhar, 2000; 
Jain, 2000; Messay, 2000; Datar, 2001; Thiruvengadam, 2006).
61 Actions of this 
type,  where  the  plaintiff  has  no  personal  interest  in  the  matter,  came  to  be 
known  as  ‘public  interest  litigation’  (‘PIL’).  As  might  be  expected,  this 
engendered  a  great  deal  of  litigation,  and  the  extensive  constitutional 
jurisprudence that has consequently been developed by the Court in response to 
PIL actions has led some to refer to the Indian Supreme Court as the ‘most 
powerful court in the world’ (Cunningham, 2003). 
 
Thus  it  seems  likely  that  the  political  independence  of  India’s  judiciary  has 
played  a  meaningful  role  in  protecting  property  rights  in  the  years  since 
independence. Despite the problems of backlog, the Supreme Court has been 
willing  to  go  to  great  lengths  to  ensure  that  cases  involving  issues  of 
expropriation or other violation of fundamental rights are heard. Yet whilst a 
powerful independent judiciary can clearly act as a constraint on rent-seeking 
legislative  measures,  this  works  as  a  double-edged  sword—following 
liberalisation in 1991, strong judicial protection has acted as a brake on the 
rapid  transformation  of  credit  markets,  owing  to constitutional  challenges  to 
reforms to debt enforcement and insolvency laws.
62  
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4.1.3 Summary  
 
To what extent, then, are the ‘adaptability’ and ‘political’ theories regarding the 
influence of a country’s legal system on financial development borne out by the 
case  of  India?  Since  liberalisation,  there  has  been  widespread  reform  of 
regulatory  mechanisms  governing  equity  markets;  reforms  have  also  been 
attempted as regards credit markets, but these have proceeded at a slower pace 
and to date appear to have been less successful.  The regulatory adaptability that 
has  been  shown  in  relation  to  stock  markets  has  emphatically  not  been  a 
function  of  judicial  law-making,  as  posited  by  the  ‘legal  origins’  literature. 
Rather, the lesson from Indian stock markets is that rapid regulatory innovation 
has  been  successfully  achieved  by  delegation  to  technocratic  regulatory 
agencies. 
 
In  contrast,  there  does  appear  to  be  support  for  the  idea  that  the  political 
independence of the judiciary in India helped to protect property rights from 
encroachment by the state. However, it seems unclear to what extent this is a 
function of India’s common law, as opposed to its constitutional, status. In the 
UK,  where  the  ‘common  law’  approach  to  lawmaking  originated,  there  was 
until very recently no constitutional protection for fundamental rights,
63 and the 
judiciary would have no legal basis for objecting to encroachments on property 
rights of the variety disputed in India during the pre-liberalisation period.
64  
 
The  Indian  case  study  also  illustrates  a  significant  tension  between  the 
desiderata  reflected  in  the  adaptability  and  political  accounts.  Adaptability 
involves  rapid  change  to  accommodate  developments  in  the  real  economy; 
political  independence  on  the  other  hand  implies  conservatism  in  respecting 
property  rights.  To  the  extent  that  the  reforms  required  for  adaptation  to 
changed circumstances are those affecting property rights, a strong judiciary 
will act as a check on efficiency-enhancing, as well as rent-seeking reforms. 
The delays following PIL challenges to the implementation of credit market 
reforms such as the Debt Recovery Tribunals, SARFAESI and the reform of 
insolvency law all flowed from the activism of India’s Supreme Court. To some 
extent, therefore, the retardation of credit market reforms—as compared with 
stock  market  reforms—may  be  a  consequence  of  their  greater  impact  on 
property rights.  
 
We have seen that two aspects of the ‘legal origins’ claim at best only partly 
explain the pattern which the development of India’s investor protection has 
followed  since  liberalisation.  And  to  the  extent  that  it  does—through  the 
‘political’ channel—the implications are at least partly contrary to the manner   30 
predicted  by  the  theorists:  India  illustrates  that  a  politically  independent 
judiciary  may  be  a  check  on  beneficial  adaptation,  as  well  as  rent-seeking. 
Entirely unexplained by theories focusing purely on legal institutions, however, 
are the apparent complementarities between industrial structure and the relative 




5. Politics and India’s pattern of legal and industrial development 
 
‘Political’ theories of the development of corporate financing patterns assert that 
both financing patterns and legal institutions are determined by the preferences 
of dominant interest groups, as mediated through the political system (see, e.g., 
Roe, 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). In this section, we first explore the 
role of interest groups in the process of law reform. The most important interest 
groups influencing the law reform agenda appear to be industry lobby groups, 
whose agenda therefore reflects and reinforces the pattern of India’s industrial 
development. This in turn implies that legal institutions were not determinative 
of India’s distinctive pattern of development. We then suggest that both India’s 
pattern of economic development and the quality of her financial laws have in 
fact  been  strongly  influenced  path  dependencies  from  first,  the  legacy  of 
colonial  rule  and,  secondly,  the  central  planning  policies  adopted  following 
independence in 1947.  
 
5.1 Interest groups and financial law reform 
 
In order to explore the role of interest groups in Indian law reform, we spoke to 
various people involved in the process—in particular, senior civil servants in the 
Ministries  responsible  for  legislative  reform  affecting  corporate  finance; 
regulators from SEBI and the RBI, and various lawyers, investment bankers and 
industry groups. A similar pattern emerged from both the Ministries charged 
with  drafting  primary  legislation,
65  and  the  regulators  empowered  to  draft 
delegated legislation.
66 We were told that most changes were either initiated 
following  lobbying  from  business  interest  groups  or  market  participants,  or, 
where  they  were  not  so  initiated,  at  the  very  least  involved  meaningful 
consultation, at a later stage in the process with such groups.  
 
5.1.1. Consultation processes 
 
There are, however, subtle differences between the Ministries and the regulators 
and even as between the two regulators, both as regards the conduct of the   31 
consultative  process  itself,  and  in  the  extent  to  which  interest  groups  are 
influential  in  affecting  the  reforms  agenda.  Although  the  Ministries  view 
drafting a new piece of legislation as very much an internal exercise, there is 
now typically public consultation and involvement of interest groups. This often 
includes the setting up of expert committees with representatives from different 
interest  groups  like  business  personalities,  bankers,  professional  bodies, 
regulators, and corporate lawyers.
67  
 
The regulators also typically set up committees comprised of experts from the 
relevant  field,  including  industry  interest  groups  and  lawyers,  to  consider 
reforms.  The  SEBI  committees  are  usually  chaired  by  well-known  business 
personalities and involve consultation with a larger number of interest groups.
68 
The RBI committees on the other hand are typically chaired by RBI officials or 
public bankers or officials from other government bodies or public financial 
institutions, rather than industrialists.
69  
 
As between the two regulators (the RBI and the SEBI), we were told that the 
RBI is said to adopt a more bureaucratic approach to the consultative process 
than is the SEBI. Conversely, industry groups are said to lead or influence the 
setting of the reform agenda of the SEBI to a greater extent than that of the RBI. 
Thus, some of the recent changes in the field of investor protection on securities 
market, like the corporate governance norms introduced in the form of Clause 
49  of  the  Listing  Agreement  have  been  a  result  of  initiatives  of  industry 
associations – mainly the voluntary code for ‘Desirable Corporate Governance’ 
by the Confederation of Indian Industries (‘CII’), an influential industry interest 
group.  
 
5.1.2 Nature and extent of interaction 
 
The involvement of interest groups, and the extent to which the government was 
willing to interact with them, has increased significantly over the past 20 years. 
Prior to liberalisation, consultation with industry participants was limited to pre-
budget discussions over provisions in the budget. Our interviewees spoke of a 
marked  difference  in  the  attitude  of  the  government  following  the  onset  of 
liberalisation,  now  being  more  open  to  interacting  with  interest  groups.  It 
appears that the most influential interest groups are business or industry groups, 
corporate lawyers, professional bodies, and in the case of reforms affecting the 
banking  sector  also  the  public  and  private  banks  and  public  financial 
institutions.
70  
   32 
The  level  of  involvement  of  different  interest  groups  varies.  For  instance, 
corporate  lawyers  are  involved  at  all  stages  of  legal  or  regulatory  change, 
ranging  from  participation  in  wider  consultation,  to  being  part  of  expert 
committees to a more direct involvement in assisting the ministries or regulators 




Indian  industry,  represented  by  various  interest  groups,  appears  to  be  the 
principal constituency influencing the reform agenda in the production of new 
laws at both ministerial and regulatory levels. Publicly-traded firms in India 
typically  have  controlling  interests  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  family 
blockholders  (Khanna  and  Palepu,  2005).  The  powerful  networks  and  high 
concentration of wealth of leading business families enables them to act as an 
effective  interest  group  in  seeking  regulatory  reform.  Indian  industry  exerts 
influence through well-established and organised channels of trade and industry 
associations. Umbrella organisations like the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce  of  Industry  (‘FICCI’)  and  the  Confederation  of  Indian  Industry 
(‘CII’) are amongst the most active, followed by the several local chambers of 
commerce  and  a  range  of  industry-specific  associations.  All  these  bodies 
generally follow an ‘events-based system’ in which seminars, round-tables and 
workshops are regularly organised to provide a common platform for discussion 
and  consensus-building  on  topical  issues  by  involving  government 
representatives (even ministerial delegated), representatives of the regulators, as 
well as experts and industry representatives.  
 
As far as banks are concerned, the Indian Banks Association (‘IBA’) provides a 
formal  channel  for  the  exchange  of  ideas  and  for  influencing  policies.
72 
However,  it  was  suggested  to  us  that  in  practice  the  voices  of  private  and 
foreign banks, although formally part of the RBI’s consultation process, may 
not be heard as clearly as those of the large publicly-owned banks. There is a 
concern that the RBI, which itself holds stakes in a number of the public banks, 
may be subject to conflicts of interest leading it to focus on the interests of 
public rather than private concerns (Thomas, 2006).
73 However, the increase in 
competition in the banking sector has been responsible for creating new interest 
groups representing private banks and foreign banks, which have been able to 
exert some influence at the ministry level in the reforms agenda. For instance, 
we were informed by some of our interviewees that a significant part of the 
impetus for SARFAESI came from the systematic, and ultimately successful, 
lobbying efforts of the largest private bank in India. 
   33 
Labour unions, we were told, do not tend to get directly involved in affecting 
the reform agenda with regard to investor protection, especially in relation to 
regulations introduced by SEBI or the RBI. However, they have been involved 
in political lobbying regarding changes to corporate insolvency law, seeking 
(successfully to date) to avoid reforms which might diminish the pro-employee 
features of the current insolvency laws (Umerji, 2004). Moreover, labour unions 
and groups representing small businesses have been amongst those that have 
used the wide standing rules available for public interest litigation to challenge 
the introduction of legislative reforms such as the Second Amendment to the 
Companies Act 1956.  
 
The general picture that emerges may be summed up by three observations. 
First, reforms that have taken the form of delegated legislation promulgated by 
technocratic regulators such as the SEBI and the RBI have proceeded  more 
quickly, and with less political hold-up, than have reforms that have depended 
on the passage of primary legislation. Secondly, as between SEBI and the RBI, 
the former has been more effective in implementing reforms and developing 
new  institutions,  perhaps  in  part  because  of  its  absence  of  ties  with  interest 
groups  aligned  with  the  pre-liberalisation  era.  Thirdly,  it  is  the  needs  of 
businesses  in  raising  capital,  as  opposed  to  investors—whether  foreign  or 
domestic—and employees, that have been catered to by those responsible for 
reform, and by SEBI in particular. The relevant reforms appear to have been 
driven  in large  part  by business’  desire  for  greater  access  to  finance.  These 
points help to explain several aspects of the pattern of Indian law and finance 
set out in Section 3. Within this framework, the voice of industries in which 
India  has  been  particularly  successful—software,  hi-tech  manufacturing  and 
services—may have dominated the law-reform agenda. These types of business, 
lacking  hard  assets  which  may  be  seized  by  creditors  on  default,  are  better 
complemented by equity, rather than debt, finance. Hence interest groups lead 
from industry may be expected to exert greater pressure for reforms in relation 
to equity, rather than debt, finance.  
 
5.2 Path dependencies  
 
We conclude this section by suggesting that many of the key features of the 
pattern  of  legal  and  financial  development  in  India  since  liberalisation  have 
been strongly influenced by historically contingent choices made during the era 
of central planning.  
 
Under the socialist regimes that governed India from 1947 until 1991, a series 
of plans were instituted for the development of India’s industry (Rothermund,   34 
1988; Lal, 2005; Kochhar et al 2006). These focused on (i) developing capital-
intensive infrastructure projects; (ii) ‘prestige’ industries. The way in which the 
‘flagship’ industries were supported was through mandatory loans from state-
owned  banks.  Moreover,  a  certain  proportion  of  funds  had  to  be  loaned  to 
particular  industries  so  as  to  foster  their  development.  Thus  firms  in  such 
industries lacked hard budget constraints. The result of these policies, when 
coupled with import substitution, was that neither capital nor product markets 
exerted meaningful discipline on firms operating in these sectors. As a result, 
many Indian firms (mostly public sector) were inefficient, and development did 
not occur as fast as it might have. Indeed, the chronic overstaffing of many large 
(public)  firms  was  recognised  by  the  government  as  a  means  of  disguising 
unemployment. Powerful labour protection under labour laws,
74 coupled with 
protection  of  employment  in  the  public  sector,
75  made  these  consequences 
difficult to reverse.
  
The small but significant private sector, although efficient, worked subject to a 
range of restrictions, including lack of access to finance, , multiple licensing 
requirements,  extensive  labour  regulations,  import  restrictions,  and  heavy 
taxation.  
 
Another  central  tenet  of  post-independence  policy  was  investment  in  higher 
education. The combination of inefficient public sector manufacturing and high 
quality  higher  education  meant  that  India  generated  a  large  pool  of  well-
qualified individuals who had relatively limited opportunities. By the 1980s, 
more technology-oriented firms started to flourish. On the one hand, they were 
outside the framework established by the central planning regime; without such 
subsidies (and without the interference imposed by the ‘licence Raj’), they were 
forced to be efficient. On the other hand, they were able to draw upon a large 
pool  of  human  capital,  with  relatively  low  wage  costs.  As  a  result,  India’s 
software,  telecoms  and  high-tech  manufacturing  industries  have  grown 
dramatically since the early 80s. They are now the most successful sectors by 
far,  with  the  result  that  India’s  overall  pattern  of  development  might  be 
understood  as  going  straight  to  high-tech,  without  passing  low-tech 
manufacturing (Kochhar et al, 2006).
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Few areas of the Indian economy were as dominated by the State as was finance 
(Thomas 2006). Although at independence India had a fairly well-developed 
banking system,
77 post-independence–like many other developing countries--its 
banking  sector  exhibits  a  significant  degree  of  public  ownership.  Public 
ownership  of  banks  in  India  began  with  the  government  ownership  of  the 
Reserve Bank of India in 1949.
78 The subsequent nationalization of significant 
private banks operating in India established a state monopoly in the sector.
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Under  the  Banking  Regulation  Act,  1949,  the  RBI  was  invested  with  wide 
ranging  powers  for  supervision  and  control  of  banks  coupled  with  licensing 
powers  and  the  authority  to  conduct  inspections.  The  RBI  also  controlled 
interest rates (fixed deposits and lending rates) and thereby controlled financial 
transactions. There were entry barriers for new private banks, foreign banks 
were not allowed to be set up and the regulations inter alia ensured that banks 
invested heavily in government securities as their primary investments and all 
banks public as well as private had to lend (as much as 40%) to priority sector 
that too at lower rates of interest.  
 
We are now in a position to see contingent links between the ways in which 
socialist policies were implemented prior to 1991 and the development of law 
and  finance  in  India  since  then.  On  the  one  hand,  planning  and  education 
policies appear to have affected  the development of Indian industry, resulting 
in under-representation in heavy industry and in an emphasis on services and 
high-tech  manufacturing.  In  turn,  the  financing  needs  of  these  sectors—
primarily oriented towards equity, rather than debt—are heard most vocally by 
regulators and legislators in the post-liberalisation law reform process. At the 
same time, the very regulators involved in reforming credit markets—namely, 
the RBI—have been historically involved in the use of credit as an instrument 
of state industrial policy, rather than a hard budget constraint. In contrast to 
SEBI,  which  was  set  up  from  scratch  following  liberalisation,  the  RBI’s 
personnel and culture have been influenced by its former role. This may be at 
least as significant an explanation for the lack of effective credit market reforms 
as was industrial structure. Both, however, share the feature of having been 





In  recent  years,  India  has  undergone  spectacular  economic  and  financial 
development.  This  makes  it  an  interesting  and  important  case  study  for  the 
investigation  of  claims  asserting  links  between  legal  institutions,  corporate 
finance,  and—more  tentatively—economic  development.  India’s  economy  is 
heavily  biased,  relative  to  comparable  developing  nations,  towards  services. 
This is complemented by a relatively high use of equity finance and—again in 
relative terms—less use of debt finance, especially bonds. We show that these 
complementarities  are,  further,  associated  with  a  particular  pattern  of  legal 
institutions:  an  effective  regulator,  and  much  new  regulation,  for  equity   36 
markets;  conversely  reforms  which  might  stimulate  debt  markets  have  been 
slower in coming and only partially implemented.  
 
We investigated the extent to which these links between law, finance, and the 
economy in India may have flowed from the nature of India’s legal system, in 
particular  its  ‘regulatory  style’  as  a  common  law  country.  One  mechanism 
sometimes said to underpin such a link is the idea that judge-made law is more 
readily ‘adapted’ to changes in circumstances. We find no evidence at all that 
this mechanism played any role in transforming India’s investor protection laws 
since liberalisation in 1991. Judge-made law, in the form of precedents, can 
only emerge at the speed at which judgments are in fact given. Indian courts are 
typically  overwhelmed  by  delays—a  typical  dispute  taking  10  years  to 
resolve—and so it is impossible for the judiciary to act as an agent of rapid legal 
change.  
 
An alternative claim asserts that common law systems have an advantage over 
their civil law counterparts owing to relatively greater judicial independence, 
which can act as a constraint on rent-extraction by the state. We find some 
evidence  that  India’s  independent  judiciary  played  a  meaningful  role  in 
protecting individual property rights from state expropriation during the era of 
central planning. Moreover, whilst a highly independent judiciary may assist in 
preventing adverse economic outcomes at some points in history, the Indian 
experience with public interest litigation being used to delay the passage of 
creditor-oriented reforms in the past 15 years suggests that it may also act as a 
brake on positive legal change under some circumstances too. 
 
Together, these findings imply a significantly more modest role for law than is 
commonly understood in the ‘law and finance’ literature, which accords much 
weight to the civil or common law nature of a country’s legal system. Indeed, 
the pattern of complementarities between India’s legal, financial and economic 
structure do not appear to have been determined by the country’s legal origin. 
Rather,  we  find  more  support  for  the  claim  that  economic  structure  is  a 
determinant of financial structure. Moreover, this in turn appears to have been 
influential  in  the  relative  success  of  reforms  fostering  equity  markets,  as 
opposed to bond markets. Indian industry provides significant interest groups 
influencing  the  reform  process,  and  so  it  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  the 
regulation of equity markets should fare better than debt. The pattern of India’s 
(relatively) service-oriented economy appears to be an unintended consequence 
of the policies pursued during the pre-liberalisation period. These too have also 
had  an  independent  influence  on  legal  reform,  as  the  development  of  credit 
markets appears to have been delayed by the need to re-orient regulators and   37 
institutions from their former role in industrial policy to simply imposing a hard 
budget constraint. It seems that it may be easier to create new institutions from 
scratch (SEBI) than to reorient the culture and interest groups associated with an 
existing institution designed for a different purpose (RBI). 
 
All in all, then, we conclude that legal origins played at best a supporting role in 
bringing about India’s characteristic pattern of legal, financial and economic 
development. Political theories, and in particular those focusing on the identity 
and influence of interest groups associated with industry, allow us to explain a 
greater part of the links observed between service-oriented economy, equity-
oriented finance, rapid regulatory developments for equity markets and lack of 






1 This literature connects with other recent work on the relationship between 
financial  system  and  economic  development  (see  Levine,  1997;  Beck  et  al., 
2003a, 2003b; Berkovitz et al., 2003; Pistor and Xu, 2003; Pistor et al, 2003, 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008). 
2 These include: “antidirector rights” and creditor rights; (La Porta et al, 1997, 
1998);  regulations  governing  firm  start-up;  (Djankov  et  al,  2002);  contract 
enforcement; (Djankov et al, 2003); securities regulation; (La Porta et al, 2006); 
labour regulation; (Botero et al, 2003); self-dealing rules (overlapping with the 
earlier “antidirector rights”) (Djankov et al, 2005) and bankruptcy procedures 
(Djankov et al, 2006). 
3 Other criticisms include: (1) The accuracy of the coding of legal variables has 
been questioned (see, e.g., Spamann, 2006); (2) the selection of variables to be 
coded has been criticised as being abritrary and misleading (see, e.g., Cools, 
2005; Braendle, 2006;Lele and Siems, 2007); (3)  the regression results have 
relatively low R-squareds, implying that the legal variables leave much of the 
differences in the economic variables unexplained (see, e.g., Roe and Seigel, 
2007).  
4 In 2006, India’s population was 1.1 billion, comprising approximately one-
sixth of the world's population: see http://india.gov.in/knowindia/population.php  
5 According to World Bank data, India’s economic growth during the period 
2000-2005 averaged 6.89%, as compared with a global average of 2.97%: see 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/    38 
 
6 It is worth adding that by far the largest share of the bonds issued by Indian 
companies take the form of private placements, rather than issues to public 
markets. Indeed, it is fair to say that the Indian public bond market is still 
almost non-existent. 
7 Similarly, Thomas (2006) calculates a time-series for debt-equity ratios, using 
market values of equity, for listed Indian firms over the period 1989-2005, and 
concludes that there has been a significant increase in the use of equity relative 
to debt during this period. 
8 Such placements are made by high and low quality firms in equal proportions, 
implying that the bond markets have not yet developed sufficient infrastructure 
for distinguishing between them (Shirai, 2002). 
9  For  instance,  the  Indian  Contract  Act,1872,  The  Indian  Trusts  Act,  1882, 
Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1873, Code of Civil Procedure, 1901, The General Clauses Act, 1897, 
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Bankers Book Evidence Act, 1891 etc. 
10  In  certain  circumstances,  they  could  have  the  right  of  private  sale  or 
appointment of private receiver. But these rights are available provided they are 
specifically spelt out and are further subject to conditions which are so archaic 
that in practice these rights are of little significance and almost all cases require 
the intervention of courts. See S.69-69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 
for details.  In case of debts due to State Financial Corporations (SFC), the 
SFCs had some special rights of enforcement without court orders. See e.g. S. 
29 of the SFC Act, 1951, it gives SFCs the right to take over the management or 
possession of the borrower (being an industrial concern) including the right to 
transfer the secured property by lease or sale. But these apply naturally only to 
debts due to SFCs and other creditors did not possess such special rights of 
enforcement outside courts. 
11 It is a concept unique to India – defined in the SICA, S. 3(o) as amended in 
1994 means an industrial  company which has been registered for five years and 
to has negative net worth i.e. accumulated losses exceeding its entire net worth.  
12 BIFR records show that from 1987 to 2005, 5327 firms entered the SICA 
regime.    Of  these,  only  504  have  been  successfully  revived 
(http://bifr.nic.in/geninfo.htm).  
13  Other  areas  in  which  significant  reforms  were  initiated  following 
liberalisation  included  industrial  policy,  foreign  investment,  and  trade  and 
exchange rate policy. See generally Bhagwati (1993); Joshi and Little (1996); 
Ahluwalia (2002); and Mohan (2004, 2006).  
14 The most significant liberalisation was the replacement of criminal penalties 
under FERA with a regime of civil fines under FEMA. The amount of penalty   39 
 
has been reduced to three times the amount involved as opposed to five times 
formerly prescribed. The transition from FERA to FEMA along with associated 
changes in foreign exchange policy have facilitated transactions and dealings in 
foreign exchange considerably.  
15 The SCRA has been amended on numerous occasions since liberalisation, 
including in 1992 (to make necessary changes to reflect the abolition of the 
central government-run securities supervisor and the establishment of SEBI), 
1993 1994, 1995 (when legal sanction was extended to the Listing Rules), 2000 
(to implement new rules relating to appeal to the securities tribunal), 2001 and 
2003.  The  MRTP  was  amended  by  the  Monopolies  and  Restrictive  Trade 
Practices (Amendment) Act 1991, which made changes to the criteria of firms 
that would fall within the restrictions under that Act. The SICA was amended in 
1991, 1993, 1994 and is now scheduled to be repealed under the Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act 2003.  
16 Unsuccessful attempts were made in the 1990s to replace the present act with 
a new law.  
17  For  instance,  important  changes  to  the  Companies  Act  were  made  in  the 
relevant  period  by  the  Monopolies  and  Restrictive  Trade  Practices 
(Amendment) Act, 1991, Depositories Act, 1996, Companies Amendment Act 
1996;  Depositories  Related  Laws  (Amendment)  Act,  1997,  Companies 
Amendment Act 1999, Trade Marks Act, 1999, Companies Amendment Act 
2000,  Companies  Amendment  Act  2001,  Companies  Amendment  Act  2002, 
Companies (Second) Amendment Act 2002. 
18 For example, the SEBI (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000 
(DIP) lays down the disclosure requirements and minimum eligibility norms for 
issuers  and  also  requirements  for  intermediaries  designed  to  ensure  fuller 
disclosure for the protection of investors.  
19 The Clause 49 corporate governance rules, introduced in 2001 were initially 
based on voluntary code promulgated by the Confederation of Indian Industry 
in 1998, which in turn drew heavily on the UK’s Cadbury Code of Corporate 
Governance.   However, since its inception Clause 49 has seen many changes 
introducing progressively more onerous obligations, following the influence of 
the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
20 India’s takeover regime was gradually evolved by the SEBI first in the form 
of the SEBI Substantial Acquisition of Shares Regulations 1994, then replaced 
by  new  regulations  in  1997  and  subsequently  amended  from  time  to  time. 
Whilst the take over regime in India is influenced by the UK’s City Code in 
imposing  ‘mandatory  bid’  requirement,  the  way  in  which  the  principle  is   40 
 
implemented is wholly different. Rather than being triggered at the acquisition 
of 30% of the voting rights, as in the UK, it is triggered at only 15%. However 
the  obligation  imposed  is  much  less  onerous:  the  acquiror  need  only 
cimpulsorily acquire a further 20% of the voting rights, as opposed to their 
entirety.  As  one  of  our  interviewees,  a  leading  M&A  and  corporate  finance 
lawyer, explained, this is intended to reduce the burden on the acquirer with a 
view  to  encourage  takeovers,  and  represents  an  implementation  of  the 
mandatory  bid  principle  that  is  adapted  for  more  concentrated  owbnership 
structures found in India (cf. Joshi and Little, 1996). 
21 SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulation 1992, as amended from 
time to time. 
22 The NSE was set up by a group of leading financial institutions at the behest 
of the Indian government. It started trading bonds in June 1994, and shares in 
November 1994 (see : http://www.nseindia.com/content/us/fact2006_sec1.pdf). 
23 National Securities Clearing Corporation Ltd. was established as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of NSE in August 1995 to act as a common counterparty for 
all trades at the NSE, and commenced clearing operations in April 1996. It was 
set up to bring and sustain confidence in clearing and settlement of securities; to 
promote  and  maintain,  short  and  consistent  settlement  cycles;  to  provide 
counter-party risk guarantee, and to operate a tight risk containment system. See 
http://www.nseindia.com/ for details 
24 The NSDL was promoted by the NSE along with the Industrial Development 
Bank of India (‘IDBI’) and the Unit Trust of India (‘UTI’) as an independent 
entity.  NSDL  commenced  operations  in  November  1996  and  has  since 
established  a  national  infrastructure  to  handle  trading  and  settlement  in 
dematerialised  form  and  thus  completely  eliminated  the  risks  to  investors 
associated with fake/bad/stolen paper securities. See http://www.nseindia.com/ 
for details.  
25The NSE remains India’s most liquid stock exchange. The percentage of NSE-
listed companies which are regularly traded is as high as 99.05%, as compared 
to 34.54% on BSE (NSE, 2005:95). 
26 Indeed, according to Bhattacharya and Patel (2005: 423), a number of the 
practices adopted by the NSE are actually more advanced than those employed 
by the New York and London Stock Exchanges.  
27 Soon after the inauguration of DRTs in a number of major cities, the RDDB 
Act  was  challenged  in  several  high  courts  on  the  basis  that  was 
‘unconstitutional’. Pending final verdicts in these matters, the operations of the 
DRTs  were  stayed.  The  central  government  brought  a  special  leave  petition   41 
 
before  the  Supreme  Court,  which  in  March  1996  issued  an  interim  order 
permitting the DRTs to resume functions. The Supreme Court also asked the 
central government to amend the RDDB Act to address certain legal anomalies. 
Following the passage of these amendments, the Supreme Court gave a final 
ruling in March 2002, stating that the DRT Act was now constitutional(Visaria, 
2006). 
28 See Mardia Chemicals Ltd Etc. v. Union of India and others, JT 2004 (4) SC 
308 
29 See SARFAESI ss.13-17 
30 In particular, provision was made (s 17(2)) for aggrieved debtors to appeal to 
a DRT against an extra-judicial enforcement, but were required to post a deposit 
totalling 75% of the outstanding debt. This was challenged as an inappropriate 
restriction on the debtor’s ability to appeal. 
31  In  Mardia  Chemicals  (see  above  n  __),  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the 
constitutional validity of SARFAESI, with the exception of s 17(2) (see above n 
__). In early 2005, SARFAESI was accodingly amended to permit borrowers to 
contest  extra-judicial  enforcement  under  SARFAESI  before  a  DRT  without 
having to deposit 75% of the claim. 
32  However,  some  of  our  interviewees  were  quick  to  point  to  the  practical 
problems  with  the  SARFAESI  out-of-court  enforcement  mechanism,  e.g. 
finding buyers for the assets when the company owners are hostile to the sale 
and  can  easily  manipulate  the  auction,  or  the  problem  of  protecting  and 
maintaining the property before the private sale i.e. from the time of taking 
possession and the time that the DRT will take to decide on the objections by 
borrower and the appeal/s from that decision. They conceded, however, that it 
provides banks and FIs with a new tool for negotiations and helps in bringing 
borrowers to the table. 
33 See SARFAESI Chapter IV, esp. ss.20-26. 
34  According  to  the  World  Bank  survey,  the  completion  of  a  corporate 
bankruptcy in India typically takes 10 years—a tie with Chad for the longest 
time in the world. 
35 The Eradi Committee conducted a comprehensive review of the law relating 
to reorganization and liquidation of companies, and suggested changes to the 
existing CA 1956, including provisions pertaining to reorganisation based on 
renegotiations  and  repeal  of  SICA.  The  RBI  Advisory  Group  (2001) 
subsequently recommended a separate bankruptcy code, rather than including 
provisions in the CA 1956. However, the latest report touching upon the matter-
-that of the J.J. Irani Committee in 2005-- concluded that the appropriate way to   42 
 
proceed was simply through reforms to the existing company law. In light of 
this, it looks unlikely that India will adopt a separate corporate bankruptcy code. 
36 For instance, with respect to provisions such as S.25 (O) of the Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947 requiring government consent before the closure of firms 
with 100 or more workers.  
37 For instance, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act makes it difficult 
for distressed firms to sell surplus urban land. 
38 The structure of NCLT/NCLAT was challenged in the Madras High Court in 
the case of Thiru. R. Gandhi President v. Union of India (UOI) [2004] 120 
CompCas510(Mad).  The  Madras  High  Court  gave  its  ruling  in  April,  2004 
whereby some of the provisions of the said amendment Act were held to be 
unconstitutional. The operation of the amendment Act was also stayed until a 
suitable rectification could be made. Thereafter, a special leave petition was 
filed  by  the  Central  Government  in  Supreme  Court,  where  the  matter  is 
presently under consideration: Standing Committee on Finance (2005-06). 
39  Commercial  disputes  before  courts  in  India  are  among  the  most  lengthy, 
costly and complex in the world—resulting in a rank of 173rd in the World 
Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ dataset on the ‘ease of enforcing contracts’. It takes 
1,420 days to enforce a contract in India, compared with 969 days on average in 
South Asia, 351 days on average in OECD countries, 450 days in Malaysia and 
only 292 days in China (World Bank, 2007). 
40 According to the monthly statement of pending cases for the month of 
February, 2007, see 
http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_s/pendingstat.htm 
41 Figures  as  of 7.8.2006,  Ministry of  Home  Affairs,  Department  of  Justice, 
available at http://mha.nic.in/rtijustice1.pdf and http://mha.nic.in/rtijustice2.pdf. 
42  The  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  Department  of  Justice  claims  that  the 
pendency at the Supreme Court has substantially reduced over time. However, 
the vast majority of private law claims are not heard in the Supreme Court but 
in the High Courts, where the levels of pendency have been increasing since 
liberalisation. see http://mha.nic.in/justi.htm 
43 However, amendments to the Indian Civil Procedure Code (‘CPC’) in 1999 
and in 2002 attempted to improve the situation - besides imposing a maximum 
of three adjournments, these abolished the right of second appeal in money suits 
where the value does not exceed Rs. 25,000. Further, the general power of the 
courts to extend the time prescribed in the CPC is now restricted to 30 days, 
where previously it could have been extended without limit (Ministry of Law, 
Justice and Company Affairs, 2002).    43 
 
 
44 Looking at civil litigation, under the Civil Procedure Code 1908 (‘CPC’), a 
first appeal can be made on fact or point of law to District Courts (s 96), a 
second appeal to High Courts is possible only on a point of law (s 100). If the 
second  appeal  is  heard  by  a  single  judge,  the  appellant  can  pray  for  an 
additional appeal, known as a ‘letters patent’ appeal, to a Division Bench of the 
High Court. Upon certificate by the High Court, a further appeal can be made 
on a substantial question of law to the Supreme Court - under Article 133 of the 
constitution. What is more, under CPC s 115, ‘revision applications’ may be 
filed with High Courts under certain circumstances even when an appeal is not 
possible. 
45 Another factor sometimes said to contribute to the delays is that the Indian 
population  has  a  particularly  high  propensity  to  resort  to  litigation  to  settle 
disputes.  Empirical  studies,  however,  belie  this  claim  (see  Moog,  1993; 
Wollschlager,  1998).  Moreover,  the  incidence  of  new  litigation  has  not 
increased significantly in the past 30 years—and indeed has decreased over the 
past century. Delays have rather grown owing to the legal system’s increasing 
inability  to  resolve  existing  cases,  leading  to  an  ever-increasing  backlog 
(Debroy, 2000; Krishnan, 2003; Galanter, 2007). 
46 When affairs of the company are conducted in a manner prejudicial to public 
interest  or  interests  of  the  company  or  the  shareholders  or  in  a  manner 
oppressive to any members: see CA 1956 s 397. 
47 When affairs of the company are conducted in a manner prejudicial to the 
interests of the company or to the public interest, see CA 1956 s 398.  
48 For instance, see Needle Industries (India) Ltd v. Needle Industries Newey 
(India) Holding Ltd (1981) 51 Com Cases 743 (SC); Chander Krishan Gupta v. 
Pannalal  Girdhari  Lal  Pvt.  Ltd.  (1984)  55  Com  Cases  702;  Re  Malayalam 
Plantations (India) Ltd. (1991) 5 Corpt LA 361 (Ker); Akbar Ali A. Kalvert v. 
Konkan Chemicals Pvt Ltd. (1997) 88 Com Cases 245 (CLB); Re AIR Asiatic 
Ltd (1994) 3 Comp LJ 294 (CLB). 
49 The constitutional scheme is designed to maintain the independence of the 
Supreme Court. A Supreme Court judge can be appointed by the President, but 
only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India (proviso to Art 124 (2) of 
the Constitution of India). Once appointed, such a judge can be removed from 
office only by impeachment in the Parliament with two-thirds majority (Art 124 
(4)). However, following a period of excessive executive interference in judicial 
appointments  at  the  Supreme  Court  during  the  1970s,  jeopardising  the 
independence of judiciary  (see Desai and Muralidhar, 2000), the Court has   44 
 
developed a system of collegium by judges which operates, in effect, to rule out 
any  executive  interference  whatsoever:  see  Supreme  Court  Advocates-on-
Record Association v Union of India 1994 SC 268 and the Presidential reference 
made on 23rd July, 1998. 
50 Basic individual rights are given constitutional protection as the ‘fundamental 
rights’ guaranteed under Part III (Art 12-35) of the Constitution of India.  
51 Art xx. 
52 AIR 1951 Patna 91 
53 Established since the Mughal era, the system of zamindari rights granted the 
‘zamindars’,  or  intermediaries,  special  powers  over  land  in  return  for  an 
obligation to collect and pay fixed amount of land revenue to the rulers. By the 
time of the British Raj, the zamindars were treated as landlords of the lands for 
which  they  collected  taxes  and  the  farmers  that  worked  the  land  for  crops 
became their tenants.  
54 Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, introducing new Art 31B which 
provided that the Acts mentioned in a new Schedule IX (listing, at the time, 
thirteen state land law reform statutes) would not be deemed to be void on the 
ground of their taking away or abridging any of the fundamental rights. As 
observed by Jain (2000), ‘…a new technique of constitutional amendment, by 
way of incorporating legislative acts in the constitution itself, was initiated to 
immunize them and make them fully unchangeable in a court against any attack 
under any fundamental rights’.  
55 State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, AIR 1954 SC 170.  
56 The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955 amended Art 31 (2) so as to 
make  the  question  of  ‘adequacy’  of  compensation  non-justiciable.  A  new 
clause, Art 31 (2)A was added and Art 31A, added by the First Amendment, 
was further expanded to include more categories of ‘deprivation’ of property 
which  were  to  be  immune  from  challenge  on  the  basis  of  violation  of 
fundamental rights. More Acts were also added to Schedule IX itself. 
57 The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964 further expanded the 
scope of Art 31A and Schedule IX to widen the meaning of ‘estate’, thereby 
putting a range of new enactments beyond the possibility of judicial challenge,  
and by adding several further central and state Acts to Schedule IX so as to 
immunize them. 
58 Vajravelu v Special Deputy Collector AIR 1965 SC 1017; Union of India v 
the Medical Corporation of India AIR 1967 SC 637 (later overruled by the 
Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v Shantilal AIR 1969 SC 64).   45 
 
59 R.C. Cooper v Union of India AIR 1969 SC 1126 
60 Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act 1978, repealing Art 31 of the 
Constitution of India.  
61 The ‘Judge’s case’ or S.P. Gupta v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, is 
commonly regarded as the beginning of PIL in India (Jain, 2000).  
62 See above, text to nn __-__. 
63 The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) marked a significant departure, but even 
this does not give the judiciary power to strike down primary legislation as 
unconstitutional, merely to ask Parliament to reconsider.  
64 To be sure, one should not push this point too far, as a characteristic feature 
of the Indian judiciary’s intervention has been an expansionist interpretation of 
what legal bases were open to them under the constitution for checking execut 
65 Namely, the Ministry of Company Affairs, the Ministry of Law and Justice 
and the Finance Ministry, which are responsible for making primary legislation 
in the spheres of company, insolvency, and banking law. 
66 Namely, the regulators of the two major components of the financial sector, 
SEBI (stock markets)) and RBI (the regulator of the banking sector and various 
non-bank financial institutions). 
67  For  instance,  currently  the  Ministry  of  Company  Affairs  is  considering  a 
comprehensive  reform  of  the  company  law  –  to  this  end,  the  government 
published a concept paper which was put on its website for comments from all 
interested, it then set up an expert committee chaired by well-known business 
person,  J.J.  Irani  (Director  of  Tata  Steel  and  Tata  Sons)  that  prepared  and 
submitted its report. The ministry is now involved in drafting a bill leading to 
major  reforms  along  the  lines  of  recommendations  in  consultation  with 
legislative department of the Law Ministry.   
68 For instance, the corporate governance norms adopted in the form of Clause 
49 (see above, n __) were the result of SEBI committee headed by well-known 
businessmen  Mr  Kumar  Mangalam  Birla  and  amended  as  a  result  of 
recommendations by a committee chaired by the software tycoon Mr Narayan 
Murthy. 
69  For  instance,  the  High  Level  Expert  Committee  on  Corporate  Bonds  and 
Securitization was headed by R H Patil, the Chairman of the Unit Trust of India. 
M. Narasimham, a  former Governor of the RBI headed the  most influential 
Narasimham  Committee  that  recommended  most  of  the  first  generation  and 
even some of the second generation reforms in the banking sector. To be sure, 
this  in  no  way  implies  any  lack  of  independence  or  expertise  in  the  RBI   46 
 
committees,  but  merely  serves  to  point  out  differences  in  the  level  of 
involvement of private interest groups by the two regulators. 
70 International organisations such as the World Bank and IMF were also cited 
by  our  interviewees  as  influential  in  providing  the  impetus  for  early  post-
liberalisation reforms, and as a continuing force behind the second generation 
reforms of the financial sector. 
71 Examples range from the SEBI’s takeover regulations to, more recently, a 
draft bill to introduce a limited liability partnership business form, in which 
well-known corporate law firms were involved in the drafting exercise. 
72 The IBA was formed in 1946 with 22 members. By 2003 it had 147 members, 
comprising  public  and  private  sector  domestic  banks,  foreign  banks  having 
offices in India, urban Cc-operative banks, developmental financial institutions, 
federations, merchant banks, mutual funds, housing finance corporations, and 
other  non-bank  financial  institutions:see 
http://www.iba.org.in/brief_background.asp. 
73 The RBI holds stakes in some of the important public sector banks like the 
State Bank of India, the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development 
and the National Housing Bank. However, recently, the Indian Government 
announced its intention to acquire RBI’s stakes in these entitiesin order to 
separate the ownership and regulatory functions of the banking regulator (see 
The Hindu, 2 February 2007:  
http://www.hindu.com/2007/02/02/stories/2007020203511700.htm. 
74 Indian labour laws are highly pro-worker : see Tendulkar (2004). 
75 Art 311 of the Constitution of India provides for special rules in relation to 
‘dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities 
under the Union or a State’. In effect, Art 311 ensures that a state employee 
receives the highest protection and is very difficult to remove, creating a sort of 
tenure for incumbents in such positions. 
76 From a development perspective, this does create problems. The successful 
firms tend to be capital rather than labour intensive, with the result that the 
gains from this trade are very unevenly distributed; some in the West and South 
are  extremely  wealthy,  whereas  many  villages  in  East  India  lack  basic 
amenities, and child mortality is amongst the highest in the world (see Sen, 
1998). 
77 The earliest bank in India was the Bank of Hindustan, established in 1870. In 
the early 20th century there were the ‘presidency banks’ under Presidency 
Banks Act of 1876, namely the Bank of Calcutta, the Bank of Bombay and the 
Bank of Madras. In 1921, all presidency banks were amalgamated to form the   47 
 
Imperial Bank of India that carried out limited central banking functions prior to 
establishment of Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
Seehttp://www.banknetindia.com/banking/boverview.htm. 
78 Established in 1934, the RBI took over the functions of central bank from the 
then Government (performed by the Controller of Currency) and the Imperial 
Bank of India. It was originally privately owned, but since its nationalisation 
under  the  Banking  Regulation  Act  of  1949,  it  has  been  owned  by  the 
Government of India.  
79  In  1969,  the  government  nationalized  14  of  the  biggest  private  banks 
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